The special issue this article opens engages with an apparent conundrum that has often puzzled observers of East Asian politics-why, despite the region's considerable economic integration, multilateral economic governance institutions remain largely underdeveloped. The authors argue that this 'regionalism problématique' has led to the neglect of prior and more important questions pertaining to how patterns of economic governance, beyond the national scale, are emerging in East Asia and why. In this special issue, the contributors shift analytic focus onto social and political struggles over the scale and instruments of economic governance in East Asia. The contributions identify and explain the emergence of a wide variety of regional modes of economic governance often neglected by the scholarship or erroneously viewed as stepping stones towards 'deeper' multilateralism.
Introduction
Observers of East Asia's economic and political transformations over the past few decades are often puzzled by an apparent contradiction. On the one hand, considerable regionalisation-the intensification and deepening of economic, political and social ties-has taken place. In the two decades to 2012, intraregional trade between the East Asia 15 group increased tenfold to US$5.316 trillion, 2 and regional partners now account for 50 percent of Asian countries' trade and 48 percent of their foreign direct investment inflows (ADB 2014) . As a result, many regional production networks-transnationally organised manufacturing systems where production is spread across different countries linked through trade and investment ties-have emerged in the East Asia textiles, electronics, consumer goods and automotive industries (Yeung 2009 ). But, on the other hand, East Asian regionalism-the construction of intergovernmental multilateral institutions to manage cross-border ties-remains relatively networks for electronics (Ernst 2006) . These developments indicate that scholars must investigate how modes of economic governance creatively interface with the diverse forms of regionalism emerging in East Asia, rather than simply measuring the functions of regional organisations against underlying patterns of economic interdependence between countries.
Economic governance and the politics of scale Explaining regional forms of economic governance in East Asia requires placing the politics of scale at the centre of inquiry. To be sure, the notion of scale is inherent, although underdeveloped, in all scholarly investigations of regionalism. While most scholars agree that regions are socially and politically constructed (Van Langenhove 2011; Pempel 2005) , a region is nonetheless seen as having a necessary geographical limit defined by its spatial scale (Hettne and Söderbaum 2000; Payne and Gamble 1996) . Thus, the existing literature on East Asian economic regionalism implicitly considers questions of scale when asking whether an issue is governed through national-or regional-level institutions. However, scale in these studies is reduced to one of two binary constructs-either the national territory or an agglomeration of the region's constituent states. Regionalism is thus evaluated simply as the extent to which the locus of economic governance is shifted from the former to the latter scale, or, in a practical sense, from national governments to regional multilateral institutions. This, in essence, is what geographer John Agnew (1994) describes as international relations' 'territorial trap'-the tendency to view social, economic and political relations as being confined within a single, national or regional, territorial space.
In this collection, we instead analyse economic regionalism in East Asia by conceiving of regionalism as the politically contested rescaling of economic governance between different spatial scales and attendant governance instruments. We view patterns of regional economic governance as dynamic, shaped by struggles between coalitions of political actors and societal groups over the scale, scope and functions of economic governance. This emerges out of the view, long accepted by political geographers, that regardless of whether a particular issue is managed at the local, subnational, national, regional or global level, it is politically contested. This is because each scale involves different configurations of actors, resources and political opportunity structures, and shifting governance between spatial scales carries not only economic distributional effects, but also privileges particular societal interests, normative agendas and values. Therefore, the scale at which any matter is governed is likely to be hotly contested by powerful interests in state and society seeking to advance their preferred social and political order (Gough 2004; Hameiri and Jones 2013) . In this view, the national territorial space is no more natural than other spatial configurations, and has to be constantly produced and reproduced through state action and societal contestation (Brenner and Elden 2009) .
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Similarly, what governance instruments emerge to regulate economic activities is also conditioned by social and political conflict over scale, as all modes of economic governance privilege a certain spatial scale (and those actors powerful within it) over others.
Indeed, multilateralism, which is equated with regionalism in most scholarly accounts, also has distinct social foundations and is no more natural than other modes of regional governance. When it exists and functions as intended, it is a reflection of relatively complementary socio-political agendas among regional governments manifesting in a coherent 'sovereignty regime'-the rules and expectations shaping non-interference and intervention (Agnew 2009 ). During the cold war, the internal and external communist threat provided a shared interest to East Asian elites, mainly in South-East Asia, leading to the formation of ASEAN by the original non-communist five members. ASEAN's noninterference norm reflected in no small part fledgling regimes' fear of communist revolution in their countries, whereby the enemy within joined forces with communist allies without (Jones 2012) . And even as the communist threat began to wane, the 'embedded mercantilism' of many East Asian regimes, in which competitive export-focused tradable sectors supported crony-dominated nontradable sectors, reinforced APEC's intergovernmentalism or the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (Jayasuriya 2003; Nesadurai 2003) . But the Asian crisis has undermined this accumulation strategy, leading to the greater transnationalisation of East Asian economies. This, in turn, has led to a far more uneven integration of East Asian subnational regions and sectors into regional and global economic flows, and to considerable elite fragmentation. These circumstances are simultaneously undermining multilateralism in East Asia and promoting various forms of experimentation in economic governance, with which this special issue is especially concerned.
We therefore collectively ask: What factors shape the spatial scale of economic governance in Asia? How and why (if at all) is economic governance being rescaled between the subnational, national and regional levels? And how have distinctive patterns of rescaling conditioned the forms of Asian economic regionalism observed today?
As our case studies show, many forms of 'rescaling' are evident in East Asia, apart from multilateralism, but are often not granted sufficient empirical or conceptual consideration by the literature (Hameiri 2013 ). Because we conceive of economic regionalism as the contested rescaling of economic governance, we are able to identify and explain modes of economic governance that fall outside the national/multilateral binary. Regional economic governance may take the form of regulatory regionalism, whereby ostensibly domestic institutions come to function as part of a regionally networked and coordinated regulatory regime, thus blurring the lines between national and regional governance instruments (Jayasuriya 2009 ). It might also take the form of multilevel governance, in which policy making is pluralistic and dispersed across various spatial levels (through the subnational to the supranational), and negotiated linkages between political actors intertwine to create governance arrangements (Stephenson 2013) . It might further take the form of soft-law regionalism, where intergovernmental organisations develop rules of conduct that are not considered legally binding, but nonetheless can promote regional cooperation by enumerating principles, sharing information and mediating negotiation (Abbott and Snidal 2000) . These modes of regional governance are not mutually exclusive and may converge in particular instances. Scholars of East Asian politics are typically so convinced of the commitment of the region's states to upholding strict forms of non-interference in each other's domestic affairs that they simply never imagine that such governance arrangements could exist there, so they do not bother looking for them. By conceiving of regionalism as the rescaling of economic governance, we seek to explore how these myriad forms of regionalism have developed in East Asia, their distinctive social foundations, and the social and political conflicts shaping their emergence and functioning.
Structure of the special issue
Despite their differing empirical foci, each article in this collection engages directly with contestations over the scale and instruments of East Asian economic governance in a region that is increasingly economically integrated. Individually and collectively, these articles seek to explain the factors shaping the spatial scale of economic governance in Asia and the patterns of regional integration to which they give rise. Following this introduction, the first two articles address questions regarding the design and functioning of regional governance regimes in functional spheres. Shaun Breslin and Jeffrey D. Wilson begin by revisiting the seminal work of David Mitrany and examine its relevance in the Asian context. They argue that while many of Asia's large multilateral institutions have delivered little more than summitry, a wide range of relatively effective functional cooperative arrangements are growing-albeit unevenly-through lower-level and 'bottom-up' initiatives, such as financial cooperation schemes, technical dialogues and free trade agreements. Breslin and Wilson thus conclude that there is no single 'regional space' in Asia, but rather a layering of regionalisms differentiated between issue areas. Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones then begin exploring these patterns of differentiation by examining the impressive growth of regional anti-money-laundering initiatives since the 1990s. They argue that this takes the form of 'regulatory regionalism', whereby instead of sovereignty being pooled upwards into a supranational body, ostensibly domestic agencies take on regulatory capacities within a regional governance regime. However, their case study of Myanmar shows that, far from this being a purely functional exercise, the form and actual functioning of regional anti-money-laundering governance is determined by socio-political conflicts over the exercise of state power. The result is a regulatory framework that is actually aimed at undermining rivals of the ruling regime in Myanmar, rather than tackling money laundering per se.
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The two following articles explore political contestation within multiscalar regionalism initiatives in East Asia. Natasha Hamilton-Hart provides a case study of South-East Asia's burgeoning, yet environmentally destructive, palm oil industry. This highly regionalised industry is supported by a patchwork of enabling and regulatory governance institutions at multiple scales, creating a regional form of multilevel governance. Hamilton-Hart argues that the failure of this multilevel governance to adequately regulate against the industry's worst excesses is not a case of governance failure, but a design feature shaped by the highly unequal distribution of power and wealth between different stakeholders. Czeslaw Tubilewicz and Kanishka Jayasuriya further explore the role of provincial state capital from China's south-western Yunnan Province in driving the internationalisation of the Yunnan subnational and Chinese state. They use the example of the Asian Development Bank-sponsored GMS Economic Cooperation Program to argue that regulatory regionalism increasingly occurs through the rescaling of subnational states, which are now involved in facilitating favourable conditions for the expansion of provincial state capitalist companies in neighbouring countries.
The closing two contributions turn attention to a more traditional form of regionalism-intergovernmental relations-to explore how the rescaling of economic governance interfaces with regionalism and states' foreign economic policy strategies. Indeed, a key argument of this special issue is that the organisation of economic governance along multilateral lines requires explanation, and has distinctive socio-political bases, just as much as some of the more novel forms of governance we identify. In other words, the non-emergence of supranational scales and the privileging of the national scale is a deliberate strategy to assist particular interests and agendas. Ruben Gonzalez-Vicente examines the Chinese government's self-avowed doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and its impacts on China's foreign economic relations. He argues that non-interference is, in fact, a conservative pro-business foreign policy, which emphasises the role of national governments and promotes executive-based bilateralism in economic governance. The final article by Jeffrey D. Wilson examines attempts to institutionalise intergovernmental resource cooperation in Asia, which, despite ambitious intentions, have failed to move beyond soft-law forms that offer few meaningful benefits for resource security. Wilson connects the dominance of soft-law institutional designs to governments' 'resource nationalist' policy regimes, which are, in turn, associated with the protection of powerful domestic interest groups, including industrial capital, state elites and important popular constituencies.
Key findings
The contributions to this special issue ask oft-neglected questions regarding the relationship between the politics of scale and economic governance in Asia. Although far from exhaustive in its coverage, there are, nonetheless, four significant implications we have identified that are of broader relevance to this field of inquiry. These pertain to fundamental questions of what we study when we research economic regionalism in Asia and how we should understand its principal drivers.
First, economic regionalism in Asia must be understood as a politically contested process
Regional governance initiatives do not simply emerge as functional, or technocratic, responses to collective problems, nor can their success (or failure) be solely attributed to the strength (or weakness) of shared economic interests or their technical design, as neo-liberal institutionalists often assume. Rather, they reflect struggles between the competing, and at times irreconcilable, imperatives of key economic and political actors in the region. As the rescaling of economic governance to the regional level has uneven distributional outcomes and effects on the power of powerful interests in state and society, all regional governance initiatives invariably favour the interests of certain actors (both state and nonstate) over others. Consequently, contestation between competing governance designs, and over the implementation of particular governance regimes, is commonplace in Asia, with actors and coalitions seeking to promote forms of regionalism that best reflect their interests. As the articles by Hameiri and Jones and Hamilton-Hart both illustrate, 'successful' regional governance schemes in areas as diverse as anti-money laundering and palm oil sustainability are not only driven by actors pursuing specific political agendas, but are also far from neutral in their effects. And as Jeffrey D. Wilson demonstrates for resource security, influential political actors and societal groups can also veto regional governance initiatives entirely when they clash with core interests. The implication is that the form and outcomes of Asian economic regionalism must be understood as a consequence of political contestation between key actors in state and society.
Second, economic regionalism in Asia is not simply a matter of international politics, but concerns politics at multiple scales To be sure, interstate agreements and geopolitical dynamics certainly matter, and, as Breslin and Wilson demonstrate, are significant factors behind the comparative underdevelopment of East Asian multilateral regionalism. However, equally important are the political dynamics (and diverse array of actors) found at a range of other spatial scales. The domestic policy objectives of governments are key (as Gonzalez-Vicente argues in the case of China's policy of 'non-interference'), as are political dynamics occurring at the subnational level (as Tubilewicz and Jayasuriya show in the role of Yunnan Province in driving subregional integration in the GMS). Indeed, at these spatial scales, nonstate actors are often of prime importance-for example, the role of business groups in promoting 'private' forms of economic governance that empower
The contested rescaling of economic governance in East Asia 121 corporate actors in the palm oil industry (Hamilton-Hart) . Moreover, in cases where regionalism projects are primarily driven by state actors, this is often related to efforts to secure their position and authority within domestic politics (Wilson; Tubilewicz and Jayasuriya). In this sense, political contestation over economic regionalism in Asia should be understood as a multilevel struggle, with complex interactions between political dynamics and actors occurring at different spatial scales. And furthermore, even the boundaries of these 'scales' and their interrelations are not a given, but are themselves contested and dynamic. Anti-money-laundering regulation, for example, as Hameiri and Jones show, is at the same time global, regional and domestic.
Third, there is not one, but there are many coexisting spaces of regional economic governance in East Asia
Clearly, there is no single and well-defined 'Asian' space into which regional governance projects neatly fit. Rather, economic regionalism manifests through a multiplicity of competing 'Asias' and multiscalar governance instruments. At one end, some regional governance initiatives are built on the broad concept of the Asia-Pacific, itself a contested concept, which is particularly evident in resource security (Wilson) and anti-money-laundering (Hameiri and Jones) efforts. However, alternate conceptions of the regional space also include South-East Asia (palm oil, Hamilton-Hart), subnational regions (the GMS, Tubilewicz and Jayasuriya) and even bilateralism with an otherwise regional focus (Chinese non-interventionism, Gonzalez-Vicente). To a large extent, the simultaneous existence of these different scales reflects contestation over competing designs for regionalism-as Hameiri and Jones argue, particular spatial concepts are favoured by powerful groups, which competitively seek to advance designs that best favour their interests. Indeed, in cases where differences between these interests prove intractable, economic governance can remain 'scaled' to the national level, despite strong functional reasons to develop regional cooperation schemes (resource security, Wilson). Importantly, this means that analyses of Asian regionalism must not only problematise precisely what constitutes the 'Asian space', but should also understand competition between different spatial concepts and attendant governance instruments as a consequence of contestation over whose interests and agendas regionalism will serve.
Finally, East Asia is not in transition towards 'deeper' forms of regionalism manifesting in the emergence of powerful multilateral institutions What we are observing in Asia is not the formation of regional 'building blocks' (see, for example, Rozman 2004), but fragmented and multiscalar regional governance arrangements that reflect the fragmentation of East Asian elites and societies. The transnationalisation of East Asian economies means that the interests of different societal and economic elites within East Asian states are not necessarily complementary. It also means that elites have, in many cases, developed a stake in how other countries govern particular issues domestically and are seeking to directly or indirectly shape domestic governance environments in ways supportive of their interests. This is clearly reflected in Tubilewicz and Jayasuriya's article on Yunnan's approach towards the GMS, but also in Hamilton-Hart's study of palm oil governance and Gonzalez-Vicente's discussion of China's supposed adherence to non-interference. However, ideologies of national development remain popular in the region, while elite fragmentation makes the formation of a new and widely accepted East Asian 'sovereignty regime' unlikely, if not impossible. The result is the complex and uneven terrain of regional economic governance documented in this special issue. This complexity is here to stay, since the underlying social and political conditions supporting regional integration à la European Union are simply not present in East Asia at this historical juncture, and are unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future. Therefore, scholars, practitioners, policy makers and businesses alike should not assume that, simply because broader multilateral regional institutions are not emerging, nothing is happening, and should develop more nuanced ways of analysing and engaging in East Asia's actual regionalisation processes.
